Family involvement and firms’ establishment mode choice in foreign markets by Boellis, A. et al.
Family involvement and firms’ 
establishment mode choice in foreign 
markets 
Article 
Accepted Version 
Boellis, A., Mariotti, S., Minichilli, A. and Piscitello, L. (2016) 
Family involvement and firms’ establishment mode choice in 
foreign markets. Journal of International Business Studies, 47 
(8). pp. 929­950. ISSN 1478­6990 doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1057/jibs.2016.23 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/84155/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work.  See Guidance on citing .
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/jibs.2016.23 
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
 1 
 
 FAMILY INVOLVEMENT AND FIRMS’ ESTABLISHMENT MODE CHOICE IN 
FOREIGN MARKETS 
 
  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Extant literature on foreign entry increasingly recognizes firms’ heterogeneity as a potential reason for 
inconsistency in results on the establishment mode choice, i.e. whether and under which conditions 
firms should choose to enter a new country through a greenfield investment or an acquisition. Our 
study contributes to this debate by identifying family ownership and family involvement in 
management as potential powerful sources of such heterogeneity. Integrating international business 
studies with both corporate finance literature on family firms and recent contributions from the Socio 
Emotional Wealth perspective on family ownership, we claim that, due to greater risk aversion and 
lower access to information, the family involvement either in the firm ownership and management 
leads to a higher propensity towards greenfield initiatives (vs. acquisitions). However, we also find 
that such a propensity decreases with international experience especially in family-owned firms given 
the greater ability of professionalized management to overcome family-related concerns on making 
acquisitions. Our analysis on 1,045 foreign initiatives undertaken by 311 Italian family and non-family 
firms between 2003 and 2013 confirms our expectations – indicating family ownership as a significant 
driver of international business choices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The literature on firms’ entry into foreign markets has emphasized the importance of the establishment 
mode choice between a greenfield initiative and acquisition of an existing firm in the host market (e.g., 
Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; Padmanabhan & Cho, 1999). Scholars applied several theoretical lenses, 
leading to a panoply of empirical findings and mixed conclusions about the role of several predictors 
(for a detailed review, see Slangen & Hennart, 2007). Within this context, firm heterogeneity, and 
specifically that related to corporate governance, can help shed further light on the issue (Strange, 
Filatotchev, Buck & Wright, 2009). In this paper, attention is devoted to the degree of family 
involvement in firm ownership and management. The significance of family business in modern 
economies is well documented in terms of both phenomenological and theoretical reasons. On the one 
hand, family firms (FFs) have been increasingly recognized as socially and economically dominant 
worldwide1 (e.g., Gomez‐Mejia, Makri, & Kintana, 2010). On the other hand, the literature 
acknowledges important differences in the strategies of FFs vs. non-FFs (e.g., Miller, Le Breton-Miller 
& Lester, 2010; Strike, Berrone, Sapp & Congiu, 2015), including internationalization choices 
(Fernández & Nieto, 2006). 
We assert that FFs and non-FFs differ in their establishment mode choice abroad mainly relying on the 
following explanations. First, integrating contributions from the International Business (IB) 
framework, the Socio Emotional Wealth (SEW) approach (Berrone, Cruz & Gomez-Mejia, 2012), and 
corporate finance literature on FFs (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Caprio, Croci & Del Giudice, 
2011), we argue that the family includes the firm in its utility function, thus developing an 
international growth approach that is averse to risk and dilution of control. Second, FFs hardly possess 
or have access to the relevant information needed to reduce the uncertainty associated with entering a 
foreign market, while non-FFs benefit from the greater contributions of external financial and 
institutional shareholders and professional managers (Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson & Hitt, 2003), who 
bring into the companies international experience gained in other firms, sectors, and markets. Third, 
distinguishing between family-managed firms (FMs), in which family members are simultaneously 
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key owners and managers of the firm, and family-owned firms (FOs), in which the family dominates 
the shareholder base but managers are recruited externally (Chua, Chrisman, Steier & Rau, 2012), we 
argue that the presence of the family within management is associated with a lesser endowment of 
relevant information and experience and constrains the exploration of valuable options for expanding 
abroad.  
Building upon these pillars, we claim that the greater the family involvement in the firm’s governance 
is, the more likely that the firm will prefer less risky (more cautious) entry modes in foreign countries, 
i.e., greenfield initiatives rather than acquisitions. However, information gathered directly on foreign 
markets helps reduce firms’ risk perception. This effect is particularly relevant for FFs and especially 
FOs in which talented non-family managers have a superior ability to extract information and 
knowledge from the firm’s experience in foreign markets (Levy, Beechler, Taylor & Boyacigiller, 
2007; Musteen, Datta & Herrmann, 2009). Accordingly, because of their greater understanding (and 
tolerance) of risk, FOs will expand their choice set, and more acquisitions will occur.  
We test empirically our hypotheses in the Italian context, which is an ideal test bed because it contains 
many flourishing large internationalized FFs (Miller, Le Breton‐Miller, Minichilli, Corbetta & Pittino, 
2014). We consider Italian manufacturing firms with more than 50 million euros in revenue that 
undertook foreign entries in the period 2003-2013. As a result, we examine 1,045 foreign initiatives by 
311 large Italian firms.  
We believe that, cross-fertilizing IB literature with the debate on management practices and 
sociological characteristics of family businesses, our paper provides novel ideas to explain previous 
controversial findings about the relationship between firms’ heterogeneity and the MNE’s 
establishment mode choice in foreign markets.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we illustrate the establishment mode trade-off 
and discuss the characteristics of FFs that make them differently equipped to face the uncertainty 
inherent in any foreign initiative. We then develop our conceptual analysis of the moderating role of 
international experience in the relationship between family involvement and establishment mode 
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choice. The third section presents our data set and describes the variables and the statistical models. 
The fourth section reports the econometric findings and some robustness checks, while the closing 
sections provide the discussion and some concluding thoughts on avenues of future research. 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The establishment mode trade-off  
Under conditions of firms’ liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995), the decision-making process 
regarding international growth is strongly affected by the market and event uncertainty characterizing 
the target countries, and benefits of internationalization may be difficult and costly to manage 
(Cumming, Knill & Syvrud, 2016). Thus, the establishment mode choice can be seen as a trade-off 
between the wish to effectively enter the market and access local complementary assets, which would 
lead to the acquisition of a local company, and the need to reduce financial and business risks, which 
would instead recommend more cautious greenfield investments. Indeed, entering a foreign market 
through a greenfield venture allows a company to replicate the existing organizational structure and 
reduce the uncertainty related to interactions with a foreign company. Conversely, the acquisition of a 
local company constitutes the quicker way to access resources that are difficult to acquire via arm’s 
length transactions, e.g. the foreign firm’s knowledge base (Reiche, Harzing & Pudelko, 2015). 
However, acquisitions bring their own set of risks, mainly related to adverse selection and moral 
hazard relevant to the seller-acquirer relationship (Reuer & Ragozzino, 2014). 
Several studies have investigated factors explaining how firms resolve the establishment mode trade-
off and there is a call for further research on the topic (Hennart & Slangen, 2014). Among these 
factors, firms’ heterogeneity has been held responsible for ambiguous results (Slangen & Hennart, 
2007). Here, we consider the heterogeneity related to the role of family involvement in firm ownership 
and management. 
Family firms’ risk aversion and antidotes to uncertainty 
Recent advancements in family business studies revolve around the idea that what differentiates FFs 
from their non-FF peers is the orientation of family owners to pursuing economic and non-economic 
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goals simultaneously. Reconciling predictions of agency and stewardship theories, the SEW approach 
offers a less normative view of managerial decision-making compared with classical economic 
models, in which economic and financial goals are balanced with family-centric social goals to 
preserve the stock of affect-related value that family owners have invested in the firm and to transfer 
the business to the next generation (Berrone et al., 2012). The deliberate purpose to combine economic 
and non-economic benefits of control and identification with the firm highlights a peculiar risk-
bearing attitude in FFs. Specifically, when facing decisions conferring economic gains to the firm but 
at the expense of SEW, compared with alternative actions that would preserve SEW, family principals 
will likely prefer the latter (Strike et al., 2015).  
Put differently, because families often freeze a large proportion of their financial and emotional wealth 
in the firm, they act to preserve the business, thus becoming significantly risk averse and refraining 
from actions that can jeopardize their investment, undermining the family business’s trans-
generational continuity (Faccio, Marchica & Mura, 2011). Furthermore, this risk aversion translates 
into families’ resistance to every type of action that will potentially dilute their control of the firm 
(Caprio et al., 2011).  
This attitude has relevant consequences for FFs’ capital structure because families’ behavior 
negatively affects the recourse to external equity and positively affects the use of internal funds 
(Koropp, Kellermanns, Grichnik, & Stanley, 2014). Indeed, corporate finance literature has found that 
FFs follow a growth strategy that is inherently cautious and relies on a proper mix of self-financing 
and debt financing. Specifically, while FFs use similar levels of debt as non-FFs (Anderson & Reeb, 
2003), they have been found to be more prone to relying on internal rather than external funds (Caprio 
et al., 2011).  
These financial decisions have relevant implications for the establishment mode choice in international 
operations. Being a priori averse to using external equity, when facing the opportunity to acquire a 
firm, FFs are often caught between two alternatives – debt or cash financing – both of which can have 
unpleasant side-effects. Indeed, debt-financed acquisitions can excessively increase financial leverage 
and bankruptcy probability (Furfine & Rosen, 2011), while cash-financed ones imply a high 
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probability of future unwelcome sales of new equity needed to offset the cash takeover (Marynova & 
Renneboog, 2009). Consequently, FFs prefer greenfield investments that are more flexible and can be 
modeled gradually (Brouthers & Dikova, 2010), thus being less risky and more easily self-financed. 
FFs’ higher propensity to make greenfield investments is reinforced when considering their lesser 
ability to deal with the inherent uncertainty of foreign markets. In fact, FFs are likely not sufficiently 
endowed with the relevant antidotes – i.e., information and experience – because, compared with non-
FFs, they lack or only marginally present external financial and institutional investors and professional 
managers that bring previous and contextual international experience and practices into the firm. This 
additional information and knowledge can help non-FFs understand the long-term implications of their 
internationalization strategic choices (Musteen et al., 2009) and appear essential to managing more 
risky foreign operations, such as complex acquisitions, effectively (Strike et al., 2015).  
Altogether, risk aversion, SEW, and lack of information characterize FFs and constrain the set of 
strategic alternatives that they perceive and evaluate (Arregle, Naldi, Nordqvist, & Hitt, 2012). In this 
way, family involvement crucially influences the establishment mode trade-off in favor of greenfield 
investments, which are more consistent with the specific cognitive and emotional architecture of 
family principals2.  
Family-owned versus family-managed firms 
It is worth taking into account that family presence is not a dichotomous condition because family may 
be involved to different extents in firm ownership and management. Accordingly, we distinguish 
between FMs and FOs (Miller et al., 2014; Singla, Veliyath & George, 2014). 
First, it has been shown that the disclosure of firm activities is significantly lower in FMs than in FOs. 
Family managers leverage the higher degree of opacity to extract private benefits at the expense of 
minority shareholders (Anderson, Duru & Reeb, 2009). It is reasonable to assume that FMs’ opacity 
raises buy-side constraints over equity issuance – in addition to the sell-side reluctance to dilute 
control outlined above. Therefore, external equity is likely more expensive for FMs because minority 
investors discount the risk of being expropriated by family managers due to the high opacity of these 
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firms, making the use of self-financing comparatively cheaper. As already posited, self-financing is 
more suitable to funding greenfield investments because of its steadiness and incrementalism. 
Moreover, the endowment of relevant information and expertise on foreign markets can differ 
significantly between the two categories of FFs. In FOs, external professional managers are more 
likely equipped with international experience that compensates for the inexperience of family 
principals (Menon & Pfeffer, 2003). Thus, hiring external managers helps overcome the risks 
associated with internationalization (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010) and addresses a high degree of 
information asymmetry, thus promoting more acquisitions. In contrast, the overlap between family 
owners and managers that characterizes FMs will increase the non-economic concerns of decision-
makers. In particular, nepotistic appointments of family managers selected from a small pool of family 
heirs will decrease the likelihood that they possess competencies comparable with those of 
professionalized non-family managers. This entrenchment effect (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006) 
exacerbates FMs’ perception of risk in regard to establishment mode decisions. 
Other features of FMs strengthen their orientation toward greenfields. First, core competencies in FMs 
are strictly embedded within the family boundaries, transmitted to the firm through the family’s power 
and culture, and inclined to hew to path-dependent experience and traditions (Arregle et al., 2012). 
Because capitalizing on these idiosyncratic family-specific assets via acquisitions would require costly 
and risky integration with a local organization, FMs find it more suitable to enter a foreign country via 
a greenfield investment, which allows establishing the procedures and routines developed at home at a 
low marginal cost (Hennart & Park, 1993). Second, when managers are selected among family 
members, the identity, rather than the mere alignment of interests between owners and managers, is 
ensured (Miller et al., 2014). Indeed, family managers will mutually reinforce the family owners’ wish 
to avoid riskier operations and eliminate traditional agency costs, as well as empire-building attitudes 
often characterizing external professional managers. Hence, an increasing degree of family 
involvement in leadership positions will further increase FMs’ reluctance to make SEW-threatening 
investments.  
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Building upon the preceding arguments on non-FFs, FOs and FMs, we expect that the likelihood of 
expansion abroad through greenfield initiatives (rather than through the acquisition of pre-existing 
assets) increases with the degree of family involvement in the firm. Accordingly, our first hypothesis 
is as follows:  
Hp1. The likelihood of entering a foreign market through a greenfield initiative (vs. 
an acquisition) is higher for FFs than for non-FFs. Specifically, this is truer for 
FMs than for FOs, other things being equal. 
The moderating role of international experience  
Previous studies have shown that international experience reinforces a company’s antidotes to 
uncertainty in foreign markets (e.g., Dow & Larimo, 2011). Specifically, a company’s previous 
experience in a foreign market may reduce its liability of foreignness because the company learns how 
to deal with that country (Maitland & Sammartino, 2015), i.e., to interface with local formal and 
informal institutions, the workforce, and the like, thus mitigating risk aversion and the related 
propensity to prefer greenfield investments (vs. acquisition). In our context, we argue that experience 
gained in the host country affects the establishment mode choices of non-FFs, FOs and FMs 
differently.   
While non-FFs are already well endowed with information stemming from the presence of 
experienced external actors in the firm, FFs will benefit comparatively enormously from the gathering 
of specific information on the foreign market. Thus, reduction of the relevant uncertainty will reduce 
FFs’ propensity toward greenfield investments (more than that observed in non-FFs). However, when 
distinguishing between FOs and FMs, we assert that the accumulation of specific international 
experience is likely to benefit the former even more. Indeed, thanks to their professionalization and 
previous complementary personal experience, FO managers are able to effectively absorb and transmit 
to family principals the information they lack and thus expand the firm’s set of strategic alternatives3.  
 9 
 
In contrast, FMs might be less able to integrate host country experience into their future decisions due 
to less talented family managers. Hence, the marginal effect of additional information on FMs’ 
establishment choice is likely weaker than in the case of FOs. 
Based on these arguments, we expect that the moderating role of specific international experience on 
the establishment mode choice is greater for FFs than for non-FFs. However, FOs are more likely 
influenced than FMs, mainly because of the presence of external managers. Accordingly, we formulate 
the following hypothesis: 
Hp2. Host country experience negatively moderates the relationship between 
family involvement and the likelihood of entering through a greenfield initiative 
(vs. an acquisition). Specifically, this is truer for FOs than FMs, other things being 
equal. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Data set and summary statistics 
To build the dataset, we use two secondary sources: the Reprint database, developed at Politecnico di 
Milano, which provides a census on foreign entries undertaken by Italian firms worldwide (Mariotti, 
Mutinelli & Sansoucy, 2015), and the Observatory AUB of Italian Family Businesses (Miller et al., 
2014), developed at Bocconi University, which lists governance and accounting data on Italian FFs.  
We focus on Italian firms operating at home in manufacturing industries4 with more than 50 million 
euros in revenue (according to the European Union classification of large firms). The adoption of this 
threshold excludes smaller firms whose internationalization strategies might be a priori constrained by 
the lack of financial and human resources, thus distorting our analysis of the establishment mode 
choice.  
Firms are classified into three categories: non-FF, FO and FM. In accordance with Miller, Minichilli, 
& Corbetta (2013), we distinguish between non-FFs and FFs, the latter being those firms that are 
 10 
 
controlled by one or two families with a 50% (if unlisted) or 25% (if listed) stake, or by an entity to 
which the above conditions apply5. Furthermore, FFs may or may not be managed by the owning 
family. It is common in FF literature to assume that a firm is family managed if the leader of the firm 
is a member of the owning family (Banalieva & Eddleston, 2011; Miller et al., 2013). We define the 
leader as the CEO, the executive chairman of the board or the managing director without a formal 
board of directors. If a family member holds one of these positions, we consider the firm a FM. 
Otherwise, we define the firm as a FO. 
Regarding foreign entries, we consider all the operations abroad, excluding retail (i.e., stores and 
showrooms) because investments in retail activities are usually highly fragmented and complete 
information about them is difficult to collect. Specifically, we include all the equity-based operations, 
ranging from fully-owned subsidiaries to joint ventures and minority partnerships. In this way, we 
adopt a two-way classification of the entries by distinguishing greenfield investment from acquisition 
and controlling (majority) from non-controlling (minority) ownership, the latter being defined as the 
possession of a stake equal to or less than 50% in the foreign company. 
By using the above criteria and after crossing the information between the two data sets to eliminate 
those records for which complete information on either the parent company or foreign entry is not 
available, we obtain a final dataset of 1,045 entries undertaken by 311 Italian firms in 63 foreign 
countries during the period 2003-2013.  
Table 1 presents some statistics of the sample. Specifically, the lion’s share (corresponding to 68%) of 
the total number of firms is constituted by FMs, which are responsible for 62% of the recorded foreign 
entries, FOs are 22% of the sample and account for 26% of the foreign initiatives, and the remaining is 
due to non-FFs6. On average, the sample firms have 768 employees and, notably, both FOs and FMs 
are larger than non-FFs, thus confirming the relevance of FFs in the Italian economy. 
As to the distribution between greenfields and acquisitions, it emerges that FMs prefer to establish 
ventures from scratch in 420 cases of 649 foreign entries (64.72%). This value is slightly lower for 
FOs (64.34%), while it significantly differs for non-FFs (31.45%), thus providing some preliminary 
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evidence in favor of the first hypothesis. Regardless of the establishment mode chosen, it emerges that 
firms largely opt for majority investments rather than minority ones. When the investor decides to 
undertake a greenfield investment, it chooses to hold the majority of the equity stake in 562 cases of 
634 (88.64%). There is no significant difference between FOs and FMs in this choice (89.14% vs. 
89.76%), while non-FFs have a lower preference for maintaining control over the subsidiary (which 
occurs in 74.36% of the greenfield investments). Firms’ preference for control also holds for 
acquisitions. Indeed, firms in our sample on average opt for controlling acquisitions in 364 of 411 
cases (88.56%). FOs show a higher preference for majority acquisitions (95.88%), while FMs report 
87.77% and non-FFs 82.35%. However, no significant difference emerges between the preferences for 
majority or minority investments conditional on the establishment mode chosen for every category.  
[insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 also shows that, on average, non-FFs undertake more foreign entries than their family 
counterparts (both FOs and FMs). Indeed, while the former undertake on average 4.28 foreign entries, 
the latter account for 3.94 and 3.05, respectively. Again, the main explanation resides with 
acquisitions because non-FFs show almost double the number of acquisitions per firm that FFs do. 
However, it is worth noting that the magnitude of this difference is contingent on the foreign context. 
Indeed, from the Observatory AUB of Italian Family Businesses, it emerges that non-FFs’ average 
acquisitions per firm on the domestic market are only 1.15 times the average of FFs. 
This descriptive evidence already provides some insights on the role of family control in firms’ 
international growth. In particular, the exacerbation of the difference between the acquisition 
propensity of FFs and non-FFs in the international context is consistent with our interpretation 
grounded in the fundamental relationship between liability of foreignness, information costs and risk-
aversion on the part of FFs. Furthermore, the declining number of foreign operations observed from 
non-FFs to FOs and FMs helps support our argument of a constrained choice set. 
Likewise, to provide some preliminary evidence for our second hypothesis, we report the share of 
foreign entries in a given country that are preceded by at least one other investment in the same 
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country in the previous years (starting from 2000) by the same firm. Table 1 shows that non-FFs have 
already entered the target foreign country in 45.16% of the cases. The share is definitely weaker for 
FOs and FMs, which account for 22.79% and 24.65%, respectively. When we condition this 
probability to the establishment mode, we see that non-FFs have comparable experience in the host 
country both when they opt for greenfield and when they select acquisition (43.59% vs. 45.88%). The 
result changes dramatically for FOs. Indeed, when FOs opt for acquisitions, they possess more host 
country experience (43.30%) than when they establish a venture from scratch (11.43%). This finding 
suggests that as FOs acquire experience in the host country, they are likely to prefer acquisitions and 
behave similarly to non-FFs. The impact of international experience on the establishment mode is also 
evident in FMs, although it is weaker than among FOs. Indeed, when FMs opt for greenfields, they are 
less likely to possess host country experience (17.86%), while this share is higher (37.12%) when they 
decide to acquire a foreign subsidiary.  
Finally, we investigate whether there is any particular trend in the establishment mode conditional on 
the country entered. In Table 2, we present the foreign entry distribution by country and the percentage 
of greenfield initiatives. It emerges that the share of greenfield investments is higher in developing and 
newly industrialized countries (e.g., China, India, and Russia), while acquisitions are more frequent in 
highly developed ones (e.g., the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany). An explanation is 
that acquisitions are affordable in countries where there are plenty of established firms and a 
developed market for corporate control. We consider this aspect in the following regression analyses7. 
[insert Table 2 about here] 
Dependent variable and econometric model 
To model companies’ establishment mode choice, we consider a dummy variable (Establishment 
mode choice) that equals 1 when the focal entry is a greenfield initiative and 0 when it is an 
acquisition.  
Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, we employ probit models to study the effect 
of the selected regressors on the likelihood of choosing a greenfield rather than an acquisition. We use 
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a two-way fixed-effects model for the regression analyses. The first set of fixed effects refers to two-
digit NACE code industry dummies in the sample (from 10 to 33), while the second accounts for each 
year of the foreign entry in the sample (from 2003 to 2013). Because many firms are responsible for 
several foreign entries in the period under investigation, it seems reasonable to assume that there exists 
a correlation among choices undertaken by the same parent company. Thus, we adopt firm-level 
clustered standard errors. 
Explanatory variables 
To account for the involvement of the family in the parent company, we build three dummy variables. 
Specifically, Non-family firm is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the parent firm is a non-FF 
and 0 otherwise. It constitutes the base level of our analyses. Likewise, Family owned and Family 
managed take the value of 1 if the parent firm is a FO or a FM, respectively, and 0 otherwise. 
However, both family ownership and family management may be an endogenous choice to the 
establishment mode chosen. Family ownership may be endogenous in the sense that families may 
decide to dilute their stake in the firm by issuing new equity – until the point in which they do not 
control anymore the firm and it ceases to be classified as a family firm – when they want to pursue an 
acquisition-based strategy. However, such cases are very limited in our sample. Overall, 14 firms 
(4.50% of the sample) switch from being family firms (either owned or managed) to non-family firms 
and they are responsible for 71 foreign entries (6.79% of the total). The t-test on the differences in 
greenfield ratios (over total entries) before and after the switch does not reject the null hypothesis that 
the two ratios are equal. Even though we do not instrument the model, thus ruling out any potential 
endogeneity, we can claim that there is no evident change in the establishment mode choices following 
the ownership shift. We replicate the same analysis with regard to the choice of changing management 
to pursue a given international strategy. In other words, if a FF decides to expand aggressively through 
acquisitions, then it might be more prone to appoint a non-family leader beforehand to take advantage 
of her/his managerial skills and experience. Only nine (2.89% of the sample) FFs change their leader 
during the reference period, and they are responsible for 28 foreign entries (2.68% of the total). 
Among them, seven FFs switch from a family leader to a non-family one; the remaining two switch 
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from a non-family leader to a family one. Examining the greenfield ratios (over total foreign entries) 
over the total foreign entries before and after the change, we find no significant difference8. 
The company’s host country experience is measured by a count variable (Host country experience) 
that reflects the number of initiatives that a MNE has already undertaken in a given country at the time 
of the entry, starting from 2000. Doing so allows us to compute MNEs’ host country experience also 
for the entries in the first years of the period considered (e.g., the year 2003).  
Control variables 
To control for other factors that have traditionally been shown to influence MNEs’ establishment 
mode choice, we add deal-, firm- and country-specific variables. When variables are time varying, 
they refer to the year preceding the foreign entry to ensure causality. A detailed description of the 
variables’ operationalization and source is reported in Appendix 1. 
Deal-level controls 
The same firm can undertake greenfield or acquisition for different entries in the same or other host 
countries, depending on the motivation for the investment and the resulting need to access 
complementary assets (e.g., investments can refer to a new distribution location, a core manufacturing 
activity, a diversification of the firm’s product portfolio, a backward/forward vertical expansion, and 
so on). Accordingly, we create four mutually exclusive dummy variables: Expansion in services, 
Horizontal expansion, Vertical expansion, and Diversification. 
The probability of undertaking a greenfield investment decreases when the need for complementary 
assets in the host country increases. Complementary assets – such as tacit knowledge, specialized 
resources, and country-specific assets – may not be accessed via arm’s length transactions. We expect 
that a firm’s propensity to acquire rather than build is less pronounced in the case of expansion in 
services, the bulk of which are sales, distribution, and marketing. With the exception of some 
downstream activities, such as customization and adaptation processes to address the specific needs of 
local customers, these services do not significantly require local complementary assets. Indeed, the 
acquisition propensity increases when a firm must expand its production along horizontal or vertical 
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linkages or must operate in new industries because it cannot exclusively rely on internal competencies 
and resources. 
 Firm-level controls 
Parent size. Parent size may have mixed effects on the establishment mode choice. On the one hand, 
larger firms may possess more idiosyncratic tangible and intangible resources, and greenfield 
investments facilitate these resources’ exploitation abroad. On the other hand, larger firms are likely to 
possess more financial resources, allowing them to make heavy investments, such as acquisitions. 
Parent age. Older firms are more likely experienced in their business. We control for this generic 
experience, distinguishing it from specific international experience. Parent diversification. Firms 
domestically active in several industries may have developed skills and capabilities in sharing and 
integrating diversified complementary assets. Therefore, they may also be more inclined to acquire 
assets in foreign countries (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; Dow & Larimo, 2011). Labor intensity. 
Labor-intensive firms may prefer greenfield entries to acquisitions because post-acquisition integration 
costs can be very high due to over-employment problems (Siegel & Simons, 2010). Listed. Because 
we select a different threshold to detect family control in listed and unlisted firms (25% vs. 50%), we 
control for potential differences between them. Leverage. Firms with a high level of debt may be 
hindered in collecting the resources needed to expand abroad. Although this is true for every 
investment, acquisitions usually require a huge amount of money in a limited time span. For this 
reason, we expect that firms with a heavy financial structure will find it more viable to enter through a 
gradual greenfield investment. Cash flow on assets. As a corollary to the previous rationale, firms that 
generate more operating cash flow must rely less on debt and find it easier to acquire foreign firms.  
Country-level controls 
Psychic distance. The greater the psychic distance is between home and host countries, the higher the 
perceived uncertainty is, thus pushing the parent company to opt for greenfield investments because 
they allow choosing from the outset the workforce, business routines, and other components (Hennart 
& Park, 1993). Geographic distance. The physical distance between home and host countries 
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contributes to increase the firms’ perceived uncertainty as well as the agency and transaction costs 
relevant to acquisitions (Malhotra & Gaur, 2013). GDP growth. In fast-growing markets, there is more 
room to absorb additional supply of goods (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000). By definition, greenfield 
investments add extra capacity in the host market, while acquisitions do not. GDP per capita. 
Acquisitions may not be an option to enter developing countries, where a strong and diversified 
industrial structure does not yet exist. We control for this aspect by inserting the GDP per capita as a 
proxy for the host country development. Market capitalization. Acquisitions are more likely where a 
market for corporate control exists and is liquid. We then calculate the market capitalization over the 
GDP as a proxy for the market for corporate control development. Time to start a new business is a 
proxy for the difficulty of establishing a new firm in the host country. Other things being equal, the 
more that is required to start a new business, the higher the costs associated with a greenfield 
investment are. Economic freedom. Countries with low levels of economic freedom raise barriers to 
acquisitions (e.g., Padmanabhan & Cho, 1999).  
 
RESULTS  
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the dataset. In addition to the mean and standard deviation 
of the variables, we also report the pairwise correlations. Examining the correlations, none seems to 
suggest multicollinearity issues. To remove any doubt, we compute the variance inflation factor (VIF). 
To reject the hypotheses that variables’ correlations give rise to multicollinearity, each of the VIFs 
should be lower than 10, while the mean VIF should be lower than 6 (Hair, Black, Babin & Anderson, 
2010). In the sample, neither threshold is violated, with the highest single VIF 5.74 (psychic distance) 
and mean VIF 2.19. 
[insert Table 3 about here] 
[insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 presents the results of the regression analyses9. Model (1) includes only the control variables10. 
We first focus on the deal-level controls. We adopt Expansion in services as the base level. As 
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expected, the three motivations considered – horizontal and vertical expansion and diversification – 
are negatively correlated with the propensity toward greenfield investments because these motivations 
imply proportionally more access to country-specific complementary assets than in the case of 
expansion in services. Acquisitions of local firms can be a more efficient way to access these assets. 
Examining the coefficients, not surprisingly, Diversification shows the highest difference from the 
base level, being associated with exploration strategies searching for new market and technology 
opportunities in sectors in which the firm is not active domestically (coefficient = -1.18; p-value < 
0.05). Vertical expansion has the lowest difference (coefficient = -0.62; p-value < 0.05), while 
Horizontal expansion fits in the middle (coefficient = -0.84; p-value < 0.001). 
Moving to the firm-level controls, Parent size positively influences the probability of choosing a 
greenfield investment, while the coefficients of variables approximating financial constraints do not 
come out significantly different from zero11. Finally, listed firms are keener to acquire. Possible 
explanations may reside in the fact that these firms are more used to operating in the equity markets 
and perhaps can benefit from knowledge externalities, being part of well-informed financial networks. 
Concerning country-level controls, more developed countries favor the acquisition of local firms, as 
predicted. Analogously, although the related variable (Market capitalization) is not significant, 
countries with advanced markets for corporate control favor acquisitions. It is worth noting that 
psychic distance does not turn out to be significant, in line with previous studies (e.g., Brouthers & 
Brouthers, 2000; Padmanabhan & Cho, 1999) and some criticism about the constructs of this variable 
(Shenkar, 2001)12. 
In model (2), we test hypothesis 1. The model shows that both FMs and FOs are significantly more 
likely to make greenfield investments than non-FFs (that is the base level). The average marginal 
effects – reported in model (2) of Table 5 – suggest that FMs and FOs are 27% and 28% more likely to 
establish a greenfield than non-FFs, respectively (p-values < 0.001). However, there is no difference in 
greenfield propensity between FOs’ and FMs’ coefficients (p-value = 0.94), showing that family 
involvement in management, and the consequent idiosyncrasy of family-specific assets, has a minor 
impact, not sufficient to justify a further increase in the propensity to choose greenfield investments, 
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with results indeed very high for both FOs and FMs compared with non-FFs13. Therefore, hypothesis 1 
is partially supported.  
[insert Table 5 about here] 
Model (3) in Table 4 includes host country experience. Consistent with previous results (e.g., Dow & 
Larimo, 2011), the coefficient is negative and significant and the average marginal effects show that, 
when Host country experience increases by one, the likelihood of choosing a greenfield decreases by 
2.44% (p-value < 0.05), as is apparent in model (3) in Table 5.  
To test hypothesis 2, model (4) in Table 4 analyzes the interaction effects between family involvement 
and the parent’s host country experience. Because the interpretation of the estimated results for the 
interaction terms is not as straightforward as for linear models (Ai & Norton, 2003), we rely upon 
graphical analysis as a supplementary method to coefficient testing (Hoetker, 2007). Additionally, 
because the findings could be invalidated if the groups have different unobserved heterogeneity, we 
also perform the Allison test (Allison, 1999) to avoid any potential interpretation error. The null 
hypothesis of the same unobserved variance is not rejected with a p-value of 0.90. Thus, we can 
compare the moderation terms. 
[insert Figure 1 about here] 
From model (4) in Table 4, it emerges that host country experience negatively moderates FOs’ 
propensity to enter a foreign country through greenfield (coef. -0.24; p-value < 0.05); conversely, it 
does not show any significant effect on FMs. To clarify the point, Figure 1 depicts the average 
marginal effects of choosing a greenfield investment (y-axis) by FOs and FMs – relative to non-FFs – 
at various levels of host country experience (x-axis). We compute the marginal probability – relative 
to non-FFs – to establish a greenfield initiative between the minimum (0 previous entries) and the 
maximum (22 previous entries) values of Host country experience. Accordingly, FMs’ propensity to 
make greenfield initiatives is 24.25% higher than that of non-FFs when both have no international 
experience. This greater preference holds stable along the entire range of host country experience, and 
it reaches 22.85% when both types of firms have 22 previous foreign entries in the same country. As 
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predicted, the effect is stronger for FOs because they are 21.15% more likely than non-FFs to establish 
a greenfield investment when both have no previous experience (a percentage comparable to that of 
FMs). However, as the experience in the host country increases, it has an exacerbating effect on the 
propensity toward acquisitions, as long as they undertake 21.78% less greenfield initiatives than non-
FFs when experience is at its maximum in our sample. To summarize, although a reduction in the 
noted propensity can be observed in all the firm categories when the host country experience 
increases, a large gap exists between FOs and the other two categories, with the former definitely more 
sensitive to a variation in international experience. These differences are significant at any 
conventionally accepted statistical threshold, thus supporting hypothesis 2. 
Robustness check on the role of the ownership choice 
To corroborate the results, we must rule out that the establishment mode choice is actually intertwined 
with the ownership choice in the foreign subsidiary and that the latter is inherently different for non-
FFs, FOs, and FMs. In fact, relying on an international partner can be an effective way to share the 
risk of entry and obtain country-specific information and knowledge (Mariotti, Piscitello, & Elia, 
2014). Thus, although joint ventures and other minority partnerships are viable both in acquisitions 
and in greenfield operations14, their influence on the establishment mode choice deserves to be 
investigated because the literature proposes opposing views: Hennart & Park (1993) argue that there is 
no relationship between the ownership and the establishment mode choices; other scholars (e.g., Kogut 
& Singh, 1988) suggest that such a relationship exists and should be properly taken into account.  
Thus, we model the control and the establishment mode choice as a joint decision and create four 
combinations: Acquisition & Minority, Acquisition & Majority, Greenfield & Minority, and Greenfield 
& Majority, where minority (majority) means that the equity stake is lower than or equal to (higher 
than) 50%. The new dependent variable then takes four values, according to the mentioned classes, 
while the explanatory variables remain those illustrated in the previous section. The four classes 
cannot be ordered; however, they are mutually exclusive and exhaustive with regard to the aim of this 
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work; therefore, we run multinomial logit with firm-level clustered standard errors. Econometric 
findings are reported in Table 6. 
[insert Table 6 about here] 
With no loss of generality, we choose Greenfield & Majority as the baseline model, meaning that 
estimated coefficients must be interpreted as deviations from the base level. In the first four columns 
of Table 6, we present the analyses that incorporate the standard controls, FO and FM (i.e., hypothesis 
1). Examining the Greenfield & Minority column, we see that there is no significant impact of FO and 
FM. In other words, the impact of FO and FM does not change when the stake owned in a greenfield 
investment is a majority rather than a minority one. Similarly, both categories of acquisitions (i.e., 
Acquisition & Majority and Acquisition & Minority) are negatively influenced by family owned and 
family managed, thus showing that, regardless of the ownership choice, both FOs and FMs undertake 
fewer acquisitions (vs. greenfield) than non-FFs. 
The last three columns of Table 6 also present the host country experience and its interaction with FO 
and FM (i.e., hypothesis 2). The base level is again Greenfield & Majority. When we compare the base 
level with Greenfield & Minority, we see that there is no difference in the main effects or in the 
interacted terms. Again, we can claim that FOs and FMs – also including their host country experience 
– do not behave differently according to the ownership choice in greenfield investments. Analogously, 
the interaction between FO and Host country experience is significant for both categories of 
acquisitions, while the interaction between FM and the latter is not. We then find support for the main 
finding in hypothesis 2 and rule out that the ownership choice in a foreign subsidiary varies among 
non-FFs, FOs, and FMs15. 
 
DISCUSSION  
Econometric findings support the arguments developed in this study. After controlling for deal-, firm- 
and country-specific variables that IB literature has shown to drive MNEs’ establishment mode choice, 
we find that the latter is significantly influenced by the degree of family involvement in the firm. 
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Consistent with our first hypothesis, FFs entering a foreign country are more prone to establish a new 
venture rather than acquire an existing company, compared with their non-family counterparts. 
However, contrary to our expectations, FMs do not behave differently from FOs in their likelihood of 
preferring greenfield investments. This result suggests that commonalities between FOs and FMs are 
significantly stronger than dissimilarities because SEW-driven risk aversion characterizes both 
typologies of FFs, and it plays a key role in orienting the choice of establishment mode in foreign 
markets.  
Our results also confirm that, consistent with the traditional IB literature, the accumulation of 
information stemming from previous presence in the same country negatively moderates the need and 
propensity toward greenfield entries for all the typologies of firms. However, the marginal effects of 
host country experience increase in FFs, namely being stronger in FOs. We relate this effect to the 
different information endowment that characterizes non-FFs vs. FFs. Non-FFs have a richer and more 
diversified shareholder and managerial base that a priori makes them well informed, so that additional 
international experience in the host country adds only marginally to their knowledge. In contrast, FFs 
lack solid international experience, and their perceived risk in acquiring abroad is higher, 
strengthening SEW worries about economic benefits of external growth decisions. Their risk aversion 
is mitigated only once they obtain specific international experience. However, FOs benefit more from 
this experience because their management is more equipped to absorb and leverage it. In FMs, in 
contrast, the absorption of specific international experience is inhibited or restrained by the lesser 
endowment of managerial capabilities, often exacerbated by the entrenchment effect. 
Our results contribute to the academic debate about establishment mode studies (Hennart & Slangen, 
2014) but also have implications for practice. Specifically, we suggest that FFs can suffer from 
specific features of family business that reduce and/or constrain their decision-making options. To 
better capitalize on their competitive advantages in foreign contexts, FFs must carefully balance the 
risk of SEW dilution and owner-manager misalignment with  greater involvement in the firm of 
external investors and managers that give the firm access to new knowledge and experience and 
mitigate the entrenchment effect. Indeed, FFs may achieve several advantages from opening up their 
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governance to non-family experienced actors, such as smoothing internal orientation biases, improving 
the ability to manage complex operations under uncertain conditions, and developing a willingness to 
pursue less conservative strategies that are more based on the combination of both exploitation and 
exploration activities (Patel & Chrisman, 2014). 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
As usual, the paper is not immune from limitations that, still, provide opportunities for future research. 
First, although we are aware that linking managerial choices or decision models to measurable 
performance outcomes is critical (Brouthers, 2013), we do not address whether the selected 
establishment mode is the right or the wrong choice in terms of performance. Unfortunately, the lack 
of information about performance metrics relevant to foreign investment currently hinders such 
empirical extensions. However, in spite of several works on the establishment mode choice, we still 
know little about the consequences of this choice, and such an extension ranks high on our research 
agenda.  
Second, allowing for the ex-ante heterogeneity of MNEs in terms of their parents’ performances could 
provide additional hints. For example, Nocke & Yeaple (2007) show theoretically that cross-border 
acquisitions (compared with greenfield) involve either the most or the least efficient investing firms.  
Third, the results on the relevance of host country experience encourage further investigation of its 
different components, especially the learning versus self-selection mechanisms associated with the 
repetition of successful/unsuccessful strategic choices, and related to either a specific host country or 
similar countries. However, and again, more detailed firm-level information would be needed, and its 
lack of availability currently hinders the noted avenues for development of the work.  
We also acknowledge that family involvement is a broad and complex construct that is worth deep 
consideration. Thus, we call for more research on other facets of FF’s heterogeneity, such as 
managerial structure and board of directors composition. Finally, although the Italian market is a 
particularly interesting context in which to study and compare FFs and non-FFs, the empirical setting 
 23 
 
can be fruitfully enlarged, e.g., by adding more countries to test the role of country specificities and 
generalize the results. Indeed, although we built the sample carefully, the number of non-FFs in some 
countries’ investments is limited due to the relatively minimal presence of these firms in the Italian 
context. We ran several tests to ensure that this paucity did not affect the empirical findings; however, 
it would be interesting to investigate whether the results hold in countries with a lower share of FFs. 
                                                          
ENDNOTES 
 
1 FFs dominate not only in emerging economies, such as Asia (where they constitute approximately 95 
percent of all firms), but also constitute 70 percent of all publicly traded firms in the US and almost 
half of the largest Fortune 1,000 firms. 
2 Even if a FF explores the opportunity to acquire a foreign firm, it will likely lose the competition on 
the international market for corporate control. Let us compare the competitive positions of two 
bidders, the focal FF and a non-FF. The more relevant information a firm has, the more correctly it 
assesses the risk of the acquisition. The non-FF is endowed with more information and is able to 
access and process further relevant information at lower cost. Furthermore, because family principals 
concentrate their wealth in the single FF, they do not generally benefit from wealth changes tied to 
other diversified assets and therefore err on the right-hand side of the risk distribution (i.e., they do not 
rely on the mean risk but rather something higher). Under conditions of lower information, wealth 
concentration and risk aversion, the FF faces a higher discount rate in obtaining the deal price; then, 
the non-FF will incrementally outbid the FF, and the transaction will result in an acquisition for the 
non-FF. If this continues (or the market for existing opportunities dies), then the FF will be forced to 
simply make a decision whether to establish a project from scratch, and the set of strategic alternative 
will be consequently constrained. We are particularly grateful to an anonymous reviewer for 
suggesting such an interpretation, which strengthens our hypothesis. 
3 To better clarify the point, let us return to the example of competition on the international market for 
corporate control (see note 2). Thanks to their more talented managers, when information arrives, FOs 
update their assessment of the riskiness of acquiring the target firm in the host country. Acquisition 
target prices are now more in line with those of non-FFs, and bidding is more competitive because of 
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the better understanding and tolerance of risk. As a result, more acquisitions occur. In other words, in 
comparison with non-FFs, FOs experiment a stronger (negative) marginal effect on their propensity to 
choose greenfield investments. 
4 Firms operating in industries with 2-digit NACE codes from 10 to 33, according to the European 
Union classification of manufacturing firms. 
5 The choice of such high thresholds is justified because the Italian market for corporate control is 
characterized by large blockholdings (Miller et al., 2014). 
6 It is worth highlighting that the high share of FFs in our data set is not the result of a sampling bias 
but rather is a characteristic of the Italian economy, where FFs largely exceed their non-family 
counterparts. 
7 As one reviewer notes, it seems that there, non-FFs avoid investing in certain countries. We 
investigate this issue by interacting FOs and FMs with each of the country-level controls, and no 
particular bias seems to emerge with reference to the object of this study. The results are available 
from the authors upon request. 
8 We thank the editor and an anonymous reviewer for suggesting such a test to rule out endogeneity 
between the ownership and management choice and the establishment mode choice. 
9 We also specify the models without year fixed effects. The findings are comparable to those with 
such effects. Both the coefficients and marginal effects are reported in Appendix 2. 
10 The number of controls employed is high to rule out potential omitted variable endogeneity. 
However, we run additional models with varying numbers of controls to check the robustness of the 
results, and the main effects always hold. Sensitivity analyses with fewer controls are available from 
the authors upon request. 
11 It may be worth noting that, to analyze whether financial constraints have different effects for FOs 
and FMs, we interact the relevant dummy variables with leverage and cash flow on assets; however, 
the interaction terms never come out significant. The results are available upon request. 
12 To correspond to the debate in the IB literature, we also employ the index proposed by Kogut & 
Singh (1988) and based on Hofstede’s five dimensions of cultural distance. However, because the 
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findings are similar in every model, we do not report the latter. Again, the results are available upon 
request. 
13 A complementary explanation relies upon the specific structure of control in Italian FFs, which 
exhibits high concentration, with families often acting as powerful blockholders (Miller et al., 2013). 
Under this condition, families can more closely monitor non-family managers through formal and 
moral suasion, thus easily aligning the firms’ choices with their preferences. 
14 In our sample, the share of minority operations of the total is the same for greenfields and 
acquisitions (11.36% vs. 11.44% - Table 1). 
15 The Hausman-McFadden test on the irrelevance of independent alternatives (IIA) rejects the null 
hypothesis that omitting any category affects the ratio of the probabilities of choosing any pairs of 
alternatives, with a p-value lower than 0.01. Furthermore, no category can collapse to others because 
the Wald test is always significant with p-values lower than 0.01. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics. 
 non-FFs % FOs % FMs % Total % 
Firms (no.) 29  69  213  311  
Average size (no. of employees) 567  786  799  768  
         
Foreign entries (no.) 124 100.00 272 100.00 649 100.00 1,045 100.00 
Greenfield 39 31.45 175 64.34 420 64.71 634 60.67 
Majority (> 50%) 29 74.36 156 89.14 377 89.76 562 88.64 
Minority (≤ 50%) 10 25.64 19 10.86 43 10.24 72 11.36 
Acquisition 85 68.55 97 35.66 229 35.29 411 39.33 
Majority (> 50%) 70 82.35 93 95.88 201 87.77 364 88.56 
Minority (≤ 50%) 15 17.65 4 4.12 28 12.23 47 11.44 
         
Average foreign entries per firm 4.28  3.94  3.05  3.36  
Greenfield 1.35  2.54  1.97  2.04  
Acquisition 2.93  1.41  1.08  1.32  
         
Share of foreign entries preceded by 
another investment in the same host 
country by the same parent firm (%) 
45.16  22.79  24.65  26.60  
Greenfield 43.59  11.43  17.86  17.67  
Acquisition 45.88  43.30  37.12  40.39  
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Table 2: Foreign entries distribution by country.  
Country non-FFs FOs FMs Total 
 
Foreign 
entries (no.) 
 
Greenfield 
(%) 
 
Foreign 
entries (no.) 
 
Greenfield 
(%) 
 
Foreign 
entries (no.) 
 
Greenfield 
(%) 
 
Foreign 
entries (no.) 
 
Greenfield 
(%) 
 
China 21 66.67 28 89.29 103 76.70 152 77.63 
United 
States 
31 16.13 29 41.38 49 57.14 109 41.28 
Germany 11 9.09 17 58.82 60 48.33 88 45.45 
France 4 25.00 14 42.86 50 46.00 68 44.12 
United 
Kingdom 
11 9.09 24 29.17 33 51.52 68 36.76 
India 1 100.00 13 76.92 36 83.33 50 82.00 
Poland 8 50.00 4 50.00 28 78.57 40 70.00 
Russia 5 60.00 14 85.71 19 94.74 38 86.84 
Brazil 3 0.00 16 50.00 18 77.78 37 59.46 
Spain 4 0.00 8 87.50 25 56.00 37 56.76 
Switzerland 3 33.33 4 75.00 20 50.00 27 51.85 
Hong Kong 1 100.00 5 100.00 20 75.00 26 80.77 
Belgium 2 0.00 5 100.00 16 43.75 23 52.17 
Netherlands  4 25.00 7 100.00 7 42.86 18 61.11 
Austria 1 0.00 11 54.55 4 75.00 16 56.25 
Portugal 1 0.00 2 50.00 12 58.33 15 53.33 
Turkey 3 66.67 1 100.00 11 63.64 15 66.67 
Other 
countries 
10 40.00 70 68.57 138 68.12 218 66.97 
Total 124 31.45 272 64.34 649 64.71 1,045 60.67 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics (N=1,045). 
 
  Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
(1) Establishment mode 
choice 
0.61 0.49 
 
                   
(2) Family owned 0.26 0.44 0.05                    
(3) Family managed 0.62 0.49 0.11 -0.76                   
(4) Host country 
experience 
0.91 2.61 -0.23 -0.07 -0.16                  
(5) Horizontal expansion 0.44 0.50 -0.16 -0.14 -0.07 0.09                 
(6) Vertical expansion  0.05 0.22 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.20                
(7) Diversification 0.03 0.16 -0.09 -0.04 0.02 0.07 -0.04 -0.14               
(8) Parent size 5.79 1.80 0.10 -0.14 0.16 0.15 0.04 -0.02 -0.01              
(9) Parent age 38.06 29.29 -0.06 -0.01 0.13 0.11 0.01 -0.04 0.14 0.24             
(10) Parent diversification 1.62 0.89 0.01 0.14 -0.08 -0.06 0.00 -0.03 -0.09 -0.13 -0.26            
(11) Labor cost 0.19 0.25 -0.06 0.09 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.32 -0.04 0.14           
(12) Listed 0.35 0.48 -0.05 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.03 -0.21 -0.00 0.13 0.20 0.00 0.18          
(13) Leverage 1.19 5.21 0.06 0.07 -0.10 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04         
(14) Cash flow on assets 0.02 1.03 -0.02 -0.08 0.07 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.06 -0.02 -0.20 0.01 0.06 0.00        
(15) Psychic distance 1.60 1.65 0.22 -0.07 0.08 -0.08 -0.01 0.23 0.04 0.02 0.05 -0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.00       
(16) Geographic distance 8.03 0.95 0.14 0.02 -0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.14 0.04 -0.08 -0.01 -0.02 0.10 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.62      
(17) GDP growth 0.04 0.04 0.23 -0.04 0.06 -0.16 -0.02 0.15 0.04 0.02 -0.06 0.00 -0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.74 0.43     
(18) GDP per capita 9.48 1.35 -0.25 0.02 -0.06 0.15 0.02 -0.23 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.03 -0.00 -0.58 -0.48 -0.68    
(19) Market capitalization 4.23 0.74 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.09 0.03 -0.09 -0.05 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.11 0.13 0.31 0.04   
(20) Time to start a new 
business 
0.22 0.23 0.11 0.04 -0.02 -0.10 -0.02 0.11 0.02 -0.13 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.08 0.43 0.31 -0.50 -0.22 0.29  
(21) Economic freedom 0.67 0.11 -0.19 0.01 -0.04 0.10 0.01 -0.19 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.66 -0.24 0. 18 0.42 -0.54 -0.54 
 34 
 
Table 4. Probit models. Dependent variable: Establishment mode choice (greenfield = 1). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Main explanatory variables     
Family owned  0.87*** 0.74** 0.65** 
  (0.25) (0.24) (0.25) 
Family managed  0.86*** 0.72*** 0.74*** 
  (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) 
Host country experience   -0.08* -0.05* 
   (0.03) (0.02) 
Interaction effects     
Family owned x Host country experience    -0.24* 
    (0.12) 
Family managed x Host country experience    0.00 
    (0.05) 
Deal-level controls     
Horizontal expansion -0.84*** -0.72*** -0.73*** -0.73*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Vertical expansion -0.62** -0.49* -0.54* -0.54* 
 (0.24) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) 
Diversification -1.18* -1.11† -1.09* -1.08* 
 (0.58) (0.59) (0.54) (0.54) 
Parent-level controls     
Parent size 0.08† 0.08* 0.09* 0.10** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Parent age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Parent diversification -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Labor intensity 0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.08 
 (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Listed -0.45** -0.56** -0.52** -0.52** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Leverage 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Cash flow on assets -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Country-level controls     
Psychic distance -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Geographic distance 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
GDP growth 3.60 3.69 3.44 3.69 
 (2.26) (2.27) (2.26) (2.30) 
GDP per capita -0.23* -0.21* -0.19* -0.19† 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Market capitalization  -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Time to start a new business -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.01 
 (0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.26) 
Economic freedom 0.25 0.34 0.04 0.16 
 (0.81) (0.81) (0.81) (0.83) 
Constant 1.68 0.62 0.38 0.21 
 (1.07) (1.10) (1.06) (1.06) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,045 1,045 1,045 1,045 
FO = FM (p-value)  0.94 0.90 0.61 
Efron’s pseudo R2 23.5% 25.5% 26.2% 26.9% 
Ratio of correct classifications 71.96% 73.30% 73.40% 74.26% 
Wald test a  19.52*** 27.77*** 40.08*** 
(degrees of freedom)  (2) (3) (5) 
Note: 
Firm-level clustered standard errors in parentheses 
†p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
a Reference model is (1) 
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Table 5. Average marginal effects. Dependent variable: Establishment mode choice (greenfield 
=1). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Main explanatory variables     
Family owned  0.28*** 0.24** 0.23** 
  (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
Family managed  0.27*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Host country experience   -0.02* -0.03** 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Deal-level controls     
Horizontal expansion -0.26*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Vertical expansion -0.19** -0.15* -0.16** -0.16** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Diversification -0.36* -0.34† -0.33* -0.32* 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16) 
Parent-level controls     
Parent size 0.02† 0.02* 0.03* 0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Parent age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 0.00 
Parent diversification -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Labor intensity 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Listed -0.14** -0.17*** -0.16** -0.15** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Leverage 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Cash flow on assets -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Country-level controls     
Psychic distance -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 0.02 
Geographic distance 0.03 0.03 0.03† 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 0.02 
GDP growth 1.12 1.12 1.03 1.10 
 (0.70) (0.68) (0.67) (0.67) 
GDP per capita -0.07* -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Market capitalization  -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Time to start a new business -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Economic freedom 0.08 0.10 0.01 0.05 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.25) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,045 1,045 1,045 1,045 
Note: 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
† p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 6. Robustness checks. Multinomial logit models. Dependent variable in table header. 
 Greenfield & 
Minority 
Acquisition 
& Majority 
Acquisition 
& Minority 
Greenfield & 
Minority 
Acquisition 
& Majority 
Acquisition 
& Minority 
Main explanatory 
variables 
      
Family owned -0.36 -1.12* -3.06** -0.30 -0.93† -2.78** 
 (0.54) (0.44) (1.10) (0.54) (0.48) (1.07) 
Family managed -0.52 -1.14** -1.78** -0.52 -1.16** -1.78** 
 (0.53) (0.36) (0.57) (0.53) (0.36) (0.57) 
Host country 
experience 
0.20** 0.17* 0.17** 0.07 0.11* 0.08 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) 
Interaction effects       
Family owned x Host 
country experience 
   0.20 0.42† 0.63* 
    (0.27) (0.25) (0.31) 
Family managed x Host 
country cluster 
experience 
   0.17 0.01 0.12 
    (0.11) (0.10) (0.13) 
Deal-level controls       
Horizontal expansion 1.10** 1.38*** 1.41*** 1.13*** 1.38*** 1.44*** 
 (0.34) (0.22) (0.43) (0.34) (0.22) (0.44) 
Vertical expansion 1.43† 1.03** 1.37 1.41† 1.02** 1.38 
 (0.77) (0.35) (0.96) (0.77) (0.36) (0.96) 
Diversification -0.14 2.07* 0.36 -0.18 2.04† 0.29 
 (1.33) (1.05) (0.96) (1.34) (1.06) (0.91) 
Parent-level controls       
Parent size -0.01 -0.16* -0.26* -0.01 -0.17** -0.26* 
 (0.12) (0.07) (0.11) (0.12) (0.07) (0.11) 
Parent age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.01) 
Parent diversification -0.08 0.13 -0.12 -0.10 0.11 -0.16 
 (0.19) (0.14) (0.37) (0.19) (0.14) (0.40) 
Labor intensity 0.72 0.12 1.02† 0.73 0.14 1.02† 
 (0.61) (0.39) (0.55) (0.59) (0.40) (0.58) 
Listed 0.08 0.99*** 0.36 0.06 0.99*** 0.35 
 (0.44) (0.29) (0.72) (0.44) (0.29) (0.73) 
Leverage 0.04** -0.02 -0.20 0.04** -0.01 -0.20 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.18) (0.01) (0.04) (0.18) 
Cash flow on assets 0.15 0.06 0.15 0.14 0.05 0.15 
 (0.11) (0.07) (0.34) (0.11) (0.07) (0.37) 
Country-level controls       
Psychic distance 0.43 -0.04 0.32 0.43 -0.03 0.33 
 (0.27) (0.12) (0.21) (0.28) (0.12) (0.21) 
Geographic distance -0.02 -0.16 -0.32 -0.02 -0.15 -0.31 
 (0.22) (0.13) (0.35) (0.22) (0.13) (0.35) 
GDP growth -3.56 -5.75 -11.11 -4.08 -6.12 -12.14† 
 (7.52) (4.13) (6.99) (7.84) (4.19) (7.15) 
GDP per capita 0.07 0.36† 0.12 0.07 0.36† 0.10 
 (0.33) (0.19) (0.28) (0.34) (0.19) (0.28) 
Market capitalization  0.31 0.02 0.20 0.31 0.02 0.20 
 (0.30) (0.16) (0.29) (0.30) (0.16) (0.29) 
Time to start a new 
business 
-0.35 0.28 -1.93† -0.36 0.20 -2.09 
 (0.96) (0.47) (1.17) (0.97) (0.47) (1.30) 
Economic freedom 2.13 0.25 -1.49 2.22 0.03 -1.61 
 (3.21) (1.48) (2.32) (3.23) (1.50) (2.37) 
Constant -4.09 -1.41 -12.30** -4.06 -1.18 -11.85** 
 (3.06) (1.97) (3.920) (3.11) (1.97) (4.00) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,045 1,045 1,045 1,045 1,045 1,045 
Note: 
Firm-level clustered standard errors in parentheses 
†p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
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Figure 1. Average marginal effects on Greenfield probability of family-owned and family-managed 
firms at various levels of host country (base level is non-family firms). 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. Controls description 
 Deal-level controls 
We collected and cross-checked information from different sources: Zephyr–Bureau van Dijk database 
(4-digit industry codes of parent companies and relevant subsidiaries), annual reports, and other 
companies’ releases. Accordingly, we built the following four mutually exclusive categories (and the 
related dummies):  
- Expansion in services, i.e., investments in forward and backward service activities, such as sales & 
marketing, maintenance & servicing, technical support, logistics & transportation, and other 
services related to the core activity of the firm; 
- Horizontal expansion, i.e., investments in the same manufacturing activities of the parent firm;  
- Vertical expansion, i.e., investments in activities that are vertically (backward or forward) related 
to the parent firm’s manufacturing activities; this category refers both to production in 
manufacturing, extraction, energy and construction and to functions strictly related to production, 
i.e., design, development & testing, and research & development;  
- Diversification, i.e., investments in activities that are new to the parent firm.  
Firm-level controls 
Parent size. We measure the parent’s size with the logarithm of the parent’s number of employees. 
Parent age is measured by the difference between the year of the foreign entry and the parent’s 
foundation year. Parent diversification is operationalized by counting the number of 4-digit industry 
codes in which the parent is active. Labor intensity is the ratio between the aggregate expenses for 
employees and the revenues of the firm; we log-transform it because of the log-normality of the 
distribution. Listed is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the parent firm is listed and 0 
otherwise. The variable Leverage is the ratio between the parent firm’s debt and common equity. Cash 
flow on assets is the operating cash flow divided by the total assets to rescale it. All the firm-level data 
come from the AIDA–Bureau van Dijk database. 
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Country-level controls 
To measure the Psychic distance between Italy and the host countries, we adopt the Dow & 
Karunaratna’s (2006) indicator, which encompasses five dimensions (languages, religions, levels of 
industrial development, levels of education, and political systems):  
 
where: 
Iijk is the distance between country i (i.e., Italy) and country j (with j=1, …, 63 host countries) for the 
k-th dimension; and 
Var(k) is the variance of the k-th dimension and aims to normalize for scale and heterogeneity across 
dimensions. 
We collect Geographic distance between Italy and the foreign countries’ capital cities from the CEPII 
database. Because of right-skewness of the distribution, the variable is log-transformed. GDP growth, 
GDP per capita and Market capitalization data come from the World Bank databases. Time to start a 
new business is the number of calendar days needed to complete all the required procedures to 
establish a firm. This number is then divided by 100 to rescale it. Data come from the World Bank’s 
Doing Business database. Economic freedom is an index, developed by the Heritage Foundation and 
the Wall Street Journal, ranging from 0 to 100 (it has been divided by 100 in the analyses to rescale it). 
Higher values indicate economically freer countries.
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Appendix 2. Probit models (coefficients and average marginal effects). Dependent variable: 
Establishment mode choice (greenfield = 1) 
 Coef. Marginal 
effects 
Coef. Marginal 
effects 
Coef. Marginal 
effects 
Coef. Marginal 
effects  
Main explanatory variables         
Family owned   0.86*** 0.28*** 0.74** 0.24** 0.64** 0.24** 
   (0.24) (0.07) (0.24) (0.07) (0.24) (0.07) 
Family managed   0.85*** 0.28*** 0.72*** 0.23*** 0.74*** 0.24*** 
   (0.19) (0.06) (0.19) (0.06) (0.19) (0.07) 
Host country experience     -0.08* -0.02* -0.05* -0.03** 
     (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
         
Interaction effects         
Family owned x Host country 
experience 
      -0.25*  
       (0.12)  
Family managed x Host country 
experience 
      0.00  
       (0.05)  
Deal-level controls         
Horizontal expansion -0.84*** -0.26*** -0.72*** -0.22*** -0.73*** -0.22*** -0.73*** -0.22*** 
 (0.11) (0.03) (0.11) (0.03) (0.12) (0.03) (0.12) (0.03) 
Vertical expansion -0.61* -0.19** -0.47* -0.14* -0.53* -0.16* -0.53* -0.16* 
 (0.24) (0.07) (0.21) (0.06) (0.22) (0.07) (0.22) (0.06)  
Diversification -1.16* -0.36* -1.09† -0.33* -1.06* -0.32* -1.05* -0.31* 
 (0.55) (0.17) (0.56) (0.17) (0.51) (0.15) (0.52) (0.15) 
Parent-level controls         
Parent size 0.09* 0.03* 0.09* 0.03* 0.10** 0.03** 0.10** 0.03** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) 
Parent age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Parent diversification -0.07 -0.02 -0.08 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 
 (0.09) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) 
Labor intensity 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.04 -0.01 
 (0.20) (0.06) (0.20) (0.06) (0.20) (0.06) (0.20) (0.06) 
Listed -0.48** -0.15** -0.59*** -0.18*** -0.55** -0.17*** -0.54** -0.16** 
 (0.17) (0.05) (0.17) (0.05) (0.17) (0.05) (0.17) (0.05) 
Leverage 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Cash flow on assets -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) 
Country-level controls         
Psychic distance 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 
 (0.07) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) 
Geographic distance 0.09 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.03 
 (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) 
GDP growth 3.08† 0.96† 3.40† 1.04† 2.74 0.83 3.19† 0.95† 
 (1.76) (0.55) (1.79) (0.54) (1.79) (0.54) (1.78) (0.53) 
GDP per capita -0.25* -0.08** -0.23* -0.07* -0.21* -0.06* -0.21* -0.06* 
 (0.10) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) 
Market capitalization  -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 
 (0.08) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) 
Time to start a new business -0.08 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.08 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.25) (0.08) (0.25) (0.08) (0.25) (0.08) (0.25) (0.08) 
Economic freedom 0.25 0.08 0.36 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.17 0.05 
 (0.79) (0.25) (0.80) (0.25) (0.80) (0.24) (0.82) (0.25) 
Constant 1.85†  0.74  0.52  0.34  
 (1.05)  (1.07)  (1.03)  (1.03)  
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No No No No No No No 
         
Observations 1,045 1,045 1,045 1,045 1,045 1,045 1,045 1,045 
FO = FM (p-value)   0.95  0.90  0.61  
Efron’s pseudo R2 22.5%  24.5%  25.4%  26.0%  
Ratio of correct classifications 71.96%  73.59%  73.21%  73.40%  
Wald test a   20.16***  26.71***  39.83***  
(degrees of freedom)   (2)  (3)  (5)  
Note: 
Coefficients report firm-level clustered standard errors in parentheses  
Marginal effects report robust standard errors in parentheses 
†p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
a Reference model is (1) 
  
